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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JACK KEELEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8828 
On the 24th of October, 1957, the defendant was con-
victed in the District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
of the crime of Assault with Intent to Commit Rape. 
At the time of the commission of the offense the prose-
cutrix was 10 years of age and the defendant was the girl's 
stepfather. At the trial only the prosecutrix and the defen-
dant testified. Testimony of the girl's school teacher taken 
at the preliminary hearing was admitted. The errors raised 
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2 
on appeal relate to the Court's permitting an adult to sit 
near the prosecuting witness when she testified, and to the 
exclusion of certain evidence. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
TO PERMIT AN ADULT PERSON TO SIT 
NEAR THE PROSECUTING WITNESS WHILE 
THE LATTER TESTIFIED. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
A MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY OF THE 
DEFENDANT RELATING TO A PHONE CON-
VERSATION WITH THE MOTHER OF A 
FRIEND OF THE PROSECUTING WITNESS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
TO PERMIT AN ADULT PERSON TO SIT 
NEAR THE PROSECUTING WITNESS WHILE 
THE LATTER TESTIFIED. 
At the commencement of trial the Court over objection 
permitted a Mr. Egginton, an adult person, acquainted 
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3 
with the prosecuting witness, to sit near her while she 
testified, she being a 10 year old girl. 
The following from pages 25 and 26 of the transcript is 
quoted: 
"MR. RONNOW: I will have Mr. Don Eggin-
ton, an employee of the Salt Lake City School Sys-
tem to stand by her, or sit by her on the witness 
stand. 
"MR. BARCLAY: I object to that. I object to 
him even being in the court. 
"THE COURT: I am going to permit the man 
to sit over here with the understanding he will say 
nothing to the child or make no indication as to any 
answers that are to be given, merely for that pur-
pose and because of the child's age. 
"MR. BARCLAY. All right, your Honor." 
It is submitted that appellant's point falls on either 
of the following two grounds: First, counsel for the defen-
dant at trial waived his objection to the adult being seated 
near the witness. It is noted from the above quoted portion 
of the transcript that an initial objection was made, but 
then after the Court allowed Egginton to sit near the wit-
ness, counsel said, "All right, your Honor." He thereby 
consented to the Court's ruling and waived his original 
objection. 
Second, the Court's ruling did not constitute error. 
The record does not reveal the exact position of Mr. Eggin-
ton with relation to the witness. However, the following 
information was obtained from conversing with the Dis-
trict Attorney, Mr. Rannow, from Mr. Barclay, defendant's 
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counsel at trial and from Mr. Egginton. Trial was had in 
the Honorable Judge Stewart Hansen's Courtroom and 
there the witness chair is elevated several feet above the 
floor level. At the time the prosecuting witness testified 
Mr. Egginton was seated in a chair on the floor level to 
the left and slightly to the rear of the witness. Estimates 
vary as to the distance between the witness and the adult 
from 3 to 6 feet. The witness could not see Egginton unless 
she turned her head to the extreme left. 
The only case we ha.ve been able to find presenting a 
similar factual circumstance is Evers v. State (1909 Neb.), 
121 N. W. 1005. The full statement by the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska discussing the problem there is quoted in appel-
lant's brief on pages 8 and 9. There the prosecuting wit-
ness in a rape conviction was a girl eight years of age. 
Over objection the trial court permitted an adult woman, (a 
Mrs. Wheeler) a friend of the child, to sit on the stand while 
the child testified. It appears that the adult was seated about 
6 inches from the witness. It is interesting to note that in the 
Evers case counsel objected that the adult woman was 
prompting the witness. The trial court overruled the objec-
tion but cautioned that she was not to suggest. The appellate 
court found no error for the reason that there was nothing 
in the record to indicate "that Mrs. Wheeler ever again if 
she had previously, disregarded the admonition of the 
court." There is no indication in the instant case that Mr. 
Egginton ever suggested or prompted the witness. Here the 
objection merely goes to the presence of the adult near the 
witness. 
An earlier Nebraska case, although not so similar 
factually as is the Evers case, bears on this problem. In 
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Gould v. State (1904 Neb.), 99 N. W. 541, a conviction for 
child stealing, the defendant assigned error because the 
father of the child, a girl 15 years of age, was permitted 
to sit near the child facing her when she testified. Defen-
dant alleged that this was prejudicial. The Court affirm-
ing the conviction found no error on the ground that there 
was no showing that the father's conduct was improper or 
that the testimony of the daughter was in any way affected 
by the father's presence. 
Here there has been no showing that the presence of 
Egginton influenced the testimony of the prosecuting wit-
ness, or that Egginton in any way attempted to coach or 
prompt the witness. The Court permitted the seating ar-
rangement because of the child's age and with the under-
standing that the adult would say nothing to the child. 
Appellant accepts the principal of the Evers case, supra, 
but seeks to distinguish the instant case with the argument 
that the adult here was the first person to whom the child 
revealed the incident. That contention does not have sub-
stantial merit. The child was undoubtedly frightened and 
nervous and it may not have been possible to ellicit her 
testimony unless someone was seated near her. This was 
likely this child's first experience in a court proceeding. 
Testifying at a trial is often a frightening experience even 
for an adult; it would be more upsetting to a 10 year old 
girl. The presence near her of an adult with whom she 
was acquainted gave her sufficient confidence and self-
assurance to speak. Appellant contends that the presence 
of Egginton prompted the child to make her testimony 
consistent with the description of the incident as she had 
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related it to him, earlier. But this assumes that her testi-
mony was false. Most every witness who testifies at trial 
has related his story to someone (usually one of the attor-
neys) prior to the time of the trial and there is always 
the desire to be consistent. The logical result of applying 
appellant's argument would be to bar every person from the 
courtroom who had previous to trial heard the witness' 
story. It is submitted that whether the adult is seated 
near the witness on the stand, or on the front row of the 
courtroom benches is not significant. 
In a recent case, Robinson v. State (1953 Ala.), 71 S. 2d 
843, the Court of Appeals of Alabama, spoke of the trial 
court's discretionary powers to deal with circumstances of 
the nature before the Court here. That was a conviction 
for carnel knowledge, and while a 7 year old boy, a brother 
of the prosecutrix, was testifying, there was some indica-
tion that the boy's father seated in the courtroom was 
signaling answers to the boy by nodding his head each time 
a question was asked. The Court denied error and said at 
page 845: 
"In situations such as is here presented it is 
well settled that since the trial court had the oppor-
tunity to see and hear everything that transpired, 
of necessity, much must be left to his sound dis-
cretion and his rulings will not be disturbed unless 
it clearly appears that such discretion has been 
abused." 
The above cited rule may be well applied to this case. 
The trial court saw the circumstance at first instance; he 
was able to observe the attitude and reaction of the young 
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girl and he was able to observe whether the adult attempted 
to influence or direct the answers of the witness. There 
was no showing that he had done so. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
A MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY OF THE 
DEFENDANT RELATING TO A PHONE CON-
VERSATION WITH THE MOTHER OF A 
FRIEND OF THE PROSECUTING WITNESS. 
On pages 72 and 73 of the transcript it is shown that 
at a point during trial the District Attorney moved that 
testimony as to a certain phone call be stricken. The Court 
granted the motion. Appellant argues that this constituted 
error. The objection and motion to strike came during 
the direct examination of defendant; counsel was seeking 
to show by relating specific instances that the prosecuting 
witness had a past history of lying. Defendant had been 
testifying of various instances when the young girl had 
told falsehoods. The following, quoted from the transcript 
at pages 72 and 73, during the direct examination of de-
fendant, reveals the nature of the objection: (Ruth is the 
Prosecutrix.) 
"A. A telephone call came from, well, from 
the mother of a little girl. 
"Q. Don't tell what she said. Did you talk to 
your little girl about what this lady had said to you? 
"A. I don't believe I quite understood your 
question, sir. 
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"Q. Did you talk to the little girl? 
"THE COURT: To Ruth. 
"Q. (By Mr. Barclay) To Ruth about what 
this lady had said to you about the birthday party? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. What did you say to her, to Ruth? 
"MR. RONNOW: I object on the grounds this 
line of questioning is incompetent, irrelevant and 
immaterial. Rather, this is not impeachment, and 
this man cannot attack the truth-telling qualities of 
this child by specific instances, none of these episodes 
here that he was setting up in cross-examination. 
It is improper impeachment. 
"MR. BARCLAY: I am not trying to impeach 
anybody. I am just trying to tell the truth. This 
is the evidence. 
"MR. RONNOW: Not about a birthday party; 
not about a phone call. 
"THE COURT: Yes. 
"MR. RONNOW: Did he ask her on cross-ex-
amination about a phone call? 
"THE COURT: About a birthday party. 
"MR. RONNOW: What about a phone call? 
"THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
"MR. BARCLAY: I think I did, because I had 
this list here and went down it. 
"THE COURT: I know he asked her about a 
birthday. I don't think the phone call is the impor-
tant thing, but I think it is proper so far as it re-
lates to the birthday party. 
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"MR. RONNOW: I have no memory of any 
cross-examination on the phone call. I move that 
be stricken as improper impeachment. 
"THE COURT: That may be stricken, that 
part." 
Previous to this discussion the defendant testified of other 
instances when the prosecuting witness had related false 
stories. 
It is noted that as to the other instances of lying re-
lated by the defendant, the prosecuting witness had been 
cross-examined, but as to the instance of the telephone call 
there had been no cross-examination by defendant's coun-
sel at trial. The District Attorney's objection was on the 
basis that it was not proper to attack the truth-telling 
qualities of this child by evidence of specific instances. Ap-
pellant argues in his brief that the admission of the defen-
dant's testimony regarding specific instances of lying by 
the prosecuting witness is proper whether or not the wit-
ness was cross-examined relative to the instances. It is 
submitted that such is not the rule. The following is quoted 
from Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Edition, Section 
931. 
"The impeaching testimony must be confined to 
the general reputation of the witness or to the rele-
vant trait of character, and proof of specific acts 
will not be received." 
And from Section 927, the following: 
"A witness may be discredited by evidence at-
tacking his character or reputation for truth, even 
though evidence has not been given to sustain the 
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reputation. Proof of particular instances of untruth-
fulness is not admissible." (Emphasis supplied.) 
For support of the rule, see Rau v. State (1919 Md.), 105 
Atl. 867. 
Appellant on page 17 of his brief refers to Wigmore's 
attitude that so far as a woman-complainant of a sex-offense 
charge is concerned an exception should be made admitting 
evidence of specific instances of misconduct. But it is noted 
that after suggesting such a rule Wigmore concedes that: 
"* * * By most courts no exception is made 
for this type of witness." 
See Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Edition, Section 979 ( 4). 
It is submitted that in any event the exclusion of such 
evidence did not prejudice defendant's rights. The Court 
permitted defendant to testify as to six other instances when 
he claimed the prosecutrix lied. See transcript pages 68 
to 78. The striking of or refusal to permit testimony as to 
a seventh instance certainly did not wreck defendant's 
strategy or cause him prejudice. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
GARY L. THEURER, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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